by Contributed Papers | December 9, 2010 2:52 pm
TABLE OF CASES
A. Kraishnan Iyer v. Lakshmi Amma AIR 1950 Tr & Coch 73
Amrithammal v. Ponnusani (1907) 17 Mad LJ 368
Amtul Nissa v. Mir Nuruddin (1898) 22 Bom 489
Ansar Ali v. Grey (1905) 2 Cal LJ 403
Ashkar Singh & anor v. Rawal Singh & anor AIR 1992 P & H 148, 150
Atmaram Sakharam v. Vaman Janardhan (1925) 49 Bom 388
Aziz-un-nissa v. Suraj Husain (1934) All LJ 814
Baijnath Singh v. Mussammat Biraj (1923) 2 Pat 52
Balmakund v. Bhagwan Das (1894) 16 All 185
Bhagatrai v. Ghanshyamdas AIR 1948 Nag 326
Brindabini Behari v. Oudh Behari AIR 1947 All 179
Cf Re Glubb, Bamfield v. Rogers (1900) 1 Ch 354
Chennupati Venkatasubbamma v. Nelluri Narayanaswami AIR 1954 Mad 215
Cochrane v. Moore (1890) 25 QBD 57
Collector of Salem v. Rangappa (1889) 12 Mad 404
Deo Narain v. Board of Revenue (1964) 1 All 375
Deo Narain v. Kukar Bind (1902) 24 All 319 (FB)
Deo Saran v. Deokhi Bharti AIR 1924 Pat 657
Dikshit v. Radha Krishna AIR 1948 Oudh 226
Ellis v. Ellis (1909) 26 TLR 166
Ganeshdas Bhiwraj v. Suryabhan (1917) 13 Nag LR 18
Gangadhar Iyer v. KB Iyer AIR 1952 Tr & Coch 47
Gangadhar Iyer v. KB Iyer AIR 1952 Tr & Coch 47
Gara Surppadu & ors. V. Pandranki Rami Naidu & ors. AIR 1984 AP 386, 390
Ghumna v. Ramchandra (1925) 47 All 619
Girjaprasad v. Purshottam (1926) 28 Bom LR 421
Hall v. Hall (1873) 8 Ch App 430
Jagdeo Sharma v. Nandan Mahto AIR 1982 Pat 32
James v. Couchman (1885) 29 Ch D 212
Kalyanasndram v. Karuppa (1927) 50 Mad 193
Kalyanasundram Pillai v. Karuppa Mooppanar 1928 52 Bom 313
Kanai Lal v. Kumar purnendu Nath (1946) 51 Cal WN 227
Kasi Ammal v. Vellat Gounder (1980) 2 Mad LJ 232
Khursedji v. Personji (1888) 12 Bom 573
Kilpin v. Ratley (1892) 1 QB 582
Kolandiyli Ammal v. Changaram AIR 1962 Ker 344
Mallo v. Baktawari & ors. AIR 1985 All 160, 162
Marci Celine DG Sets’souza v. Renie Fernandez AIR 1998 Ker 280
Mohori Bibbee v. Dhurmodas Ghose (1903) 30 Cal 539
Mool Raj v. Jamna Devi AIR 1995 HP 117
Mt Nazi v. Mohanlal (1957) 7 Raj 487
Mukhtiar Kaur v. Gulab Kaur AIR 1977 Punj 257
Mukhtiar Kaur v. Gulab Kaur AIR 1977 Punj 257
Narbadabai v. Mahadeo (1880) 5 Bom 99
Paul v. Nathaniel (1931) 29 All LJ 417
Perumal Ammal v. Perumal Naicker (1921) 44 Mad 196, 202
Perumal v. Perumal (1921) 44 Mad 196
Philips v. Mullings (1871) 7 Ch App 244
R N Dawar v. Ganga Saran Dhama AIR 1993 Del 19, 22
R N Dawar v. Ganga Saran Dhama DRJ 1992 (24) 532
Raja of Vizianagram v. Appalaswami (1930) 59 Mad LJ 183
Rajah Sahib Perhlad v. Budhoo (1869) 12 Mad IA 275, 307
Rameshwar Narain Singh v. Bikanath Koeri (1923) 67 IC 451
Re Dugdale (1888) 38 Ch D 176
Samrathi Devi v. Parasuram Pandey AIR 1975 Pat 140.
Sarba Mohan Bannerjee v. Manmohan Banerjee (1933) 37 Cal WN 149
Sasi Bhusan v. Chandra Peshkar (1906) 33 Cal 861.
Shakuntla Devi v. Amar Devi AIR 1985 HP 109. 111.
Shyam Behari Mal v. Maha Prasad (1930) 28 All LJ 99
Sri Raja Vencata Narasimha v. Sri Raja Sobhanadri (1906) 29 Mad 52
Standing v. Bowring (1885) 31 Ch D 282
Standing v. Bowring (1885) 31 Ch D 282
Suleman Isubji Dadabhai v. NaranbhaiDayabhai Patel (1980) 12 Guj LR 232
Sunder Bai v. Anandi Lal AIR 1983 All 23
Tara Sahuani v. Ragunath Sahu (1962) Cut 575
Tila Bewa v. Mana Bewa AIR 1962 Ori 130.
Tulsichand Kilachand v. CIT AIR 1961 SC 1023
Vannathi Valappil Janaki v. Puthiya Purayil Paru AIR 1986 Ker 110
Venkatarayudu v. Subbamma (1903) 13 Mad LJ 302
In ordinary legal effect there can be no gift without a giving or taking. The giving or taking are two contemporaneous, reciprocal acts, which constitute a gift. Section 122 of the act postulates that a gift is a transfer of certain existing movable or immovable property made voluntary and without consideration by one person called the donor, to another called the donee and accepted by or on behalf of the donee. The essential elements of a gift are:
The absence of consideration
The subject matter
Voluntary and without consideration
The essence of a gift is that it is a gratuitous transfer. Blackstone says: “Gifts are always gratuitous, grants are upon some consideration or equivalent”
It has been held that the law as to undue influence in the case of gifts is the same as that in case of contracts, ie, section 16 (1) Contract Act. More than mere influence must be proved to render the influence ‘undue’.
On behalf of the donor, the essential ingredient is that he should voluntarily and without consideration transfer the property to the donee, and the giving away implies a complete divesting of the ownership in the property by the donor.
The word ‘consideration’ is used in the same sense as in the Indian Contract Act and excludes natural love and affection. A transfer in consideration of an expectation of spiritual and moral benefit, or in consideration of natural love and affection. A transfer in consideration of natural love and affection is a gift, for such consideration is not that contemplated by the section.
Aims and Objectives:
To look into the provisions of law regarding the giving and receiving of gifts as regards the Indian scenario and more specifically the Transfer of Property Act, which deals with gifts inter vivos. Also to examine the existing case law on the issue and to trace the current situation the law is in.
Scope and Limitations:
Mainly secondary sources of data have been used in this project. The writing of the paper was restricted due to time constraints and the inaccessibility of certain key materials.
What is a gift?
What are the aspects of a gift?
What conditions does it have to fulfill for it to be a gift?
What is the position of law with regard to it in today’s context?
This paper is divided into sections that develop the logical scheme of arguments. The ordinar course is to divide the research into three or four broad categories. However the researcher felt that this would not do justice to the topic since each issue needs to be examined in isolation.
Sources of Data:
The researcher has used secondary sources of data such as books, articles and Internet documents during the course of writing this paper.
Mode of Citation:
A uniform mode of citation has been followed throughout this paper for books. Articles are cited as the journal itself prescribes.
The donor is the person who gives. Any person who is not sui juris can make a gift of his property. A minor, being incompetent to contract, is incompetent to transfer, and a gift by the minor would therefore be void. Trustees cannot therefore make a gift of the trust property unless authorized by the terms of the trust.
The donee is the person who accepts the gift. A gift may be accepted by or on behalf of a person who is not competent to contract. A minor may therefore be a donee; but if the gift is onerous, the obligation cannot be enforced against him while he is a minor. But when he attains majority he must either accept the burden or return the gift.
The words ‘accepted by the donee’ show that the donee may be a person unable to express acceptance. A gift can be made to a child en ventre sa mere and could be accepted on its behalf.
The subject matter of the gift must be certain existing movable or immovable property. It may be land, goods, or actionable claims. It must be transferable under section 6, but it cannot include future property. A gift of a right of management is valid but a gift of a future revenue of a village is invalid. These cases were decided under Hindu and Mohamedan law respectively, but they illustrate the principle.
It is submitted that in a deed of gift the meaning of the word ‘money’ should not be restricted by any hard and fast rule but should be interpreted having regard to the context properly construed in the light of all relevant facts.
In order to constitute a valid gift, there must be an existing property. Where the donor (assessee) has a credit account with a firm or with a family or with a company and the sum gifted is available to that firm or the company on the date of the gift, then a valid gift of that sum by book entries might be possible; but where a sum was not available with the firm or the family or a company which was not a banking company and had no overdraft facility, such entries would not effectuate a valid gift.
There was a divergence of views between the two schools of Hindu Law as to the necessity of acceptance of the gift by the donee, Dayabagha holding that it was not necessary but Mitakshara holding the contrary. This section has modified the indigenous Dayabagha law. A transfer of stock to the name of the donee vests the property in him subject to his right to repudiate the gift, even though he may be unaware of the transfer.
And this is so even though the gift may be onerous.
There is nothing in the section to show that the acceptance under this section must be express. The acceptance may be inferred, and it may be proved by the donee’s possession of the property, or even by the donee’s possession of the deed of the gift.
Delivery of possession of the gifted property can prove the assent of the donor, but mere assent to the gift deed cannot prove delivery of possession of the property.
Acceptance has been inferred from the acceptance of the right to collect rents in the case of a gift of tenanted property, or from the mutation in the register. Provided the donee is in possession of the property, the donor’s retention of the deed is not necessarily proof of the fact that there has been no acceptance.
When a gift of immovable property is not onerous, only slight evidence is sufficient for establishing the fact of acceptance by the donee. When it is shown that the donee had knowledge of the gift, it is only normal to assume that the donee had accepted the gift, because the acceptance would only promote his own interests. Mere silence may sometimes be indicative of acceptance, provided it is shown that the donee knew about the gift. No express acceptance is necessary for completing a gift.
Acceptance may be by a donee, who is not competent to contract, for a minor ca accept benefit though he cannot incur an obligation. And a minor’s guardian may accept a gift for him. Gift was held to be complete where the guardian accepted the gift accepted the gifts on behalf of the minor and in token of acceptance, appended his thumb impression on the gift deed.
A gift may be made by the equitable machinery of a trust; and the interposition of the trustees enables a gift to be made to a person not yet in existence and therefore incapable of being the donee of a direct gift.
A trust is not complete until the trust property is vested in trustees for the benefit of the cestui que trust.
According to the Gujarat High Court, when a settler creates a trust by settling some of his properties and appoints himself as the sole trustee, he makes a vesting declaration, and not a gift. It is not a transfer. He bifurcates his real ownership, he retains for himself the legal ownership of the property and transfers the beneficial or equitable ownership to those for whose benefit he has created a trust.
MODE OF TRANSFERS- IMMOVABLES
A gift of immovable property can only be made by a registered instrument. A ded cannot be dispensed with even for a property of small value, as in the case of a sale. And as a further precaution, attestation by two witnesses is required. This provision excludes every other mode of transfer and even if the intended donee is put in possession, a gift of immovable property is invalid without a registered instrument. But 12 years’ possession under an oral gift will perfect a title by prescription.
SIGNED BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE DONOR
The deed must be signed by the donor and a deed signed by the intended donee will not effect a transfer. It is curious that while this section uses the words ‘signed by or on behalf of the donor’, yet in the case of mortgages-s59- the words are ‘signed by the mortgagor.’ There is, however, no significance in this distinction and the words ‘on behalf of’ are merely surplusage, for where a party is illiterate, another person may with his consent sign his name for him.
A gift deed not attested by witnesses is void. Where validity of a gift-deed was specifically denied, it was necessary for the donee to examine the attesting witness of the gift deed.
The essential conditions of a valid attestation under s. 3 of the Act are that, two or more witnesses must have seen the executant sign the instrument or have received from him personal knowledge of his signature, and with a view to attest or to bear witnesses to this fact, each of them has signed the instrument in the presence of the executant. It is essential that the witnesses should have put the signature animo attestandi, ie for the purposes of attesting he has seen the executant sign or has received from him personal acknowledgement of his signature. If a person has put his signature on the document for some other purpose, for example, to certify that he is the scribe or an identifier or a registering officer, he is not an attesting witness. A gift is a document which requires two attesting witnesses.
The word ‘registered’ in this section does not mean registered in the lifetime of the donor. If the other conditions to the validity of the gift are complied with, neither the death of the donor nor his express revocation is a grounds for refusing registration. When a gift of an amount is made by a promissory note which is registered, the gift is valid and complete.
The gift of immovable property should not be made only for transferring the right, title and interest by the donor to the donee by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor and must be attested by at least two witnesses.
A gift of immovable property which is not registered is bad in law and cannot pass any title to the donee. Any oral gift of immovable property cannot be made in view of the provision of s 123 of the Act. Mere delivery of possession without a written instrument cannot confer any title.
REVOCATION BY DONEE BEFORE REGISTRATION AFTER DELIVERY
This question was considered by the courts in India, and it was ultimately set at rest by the Privy Council which decided that after delivery of the deed of gift and before registration, the donor cannot revoke the gift.
Where a gift has been effected by a registered instrument duly attested and the gift has been acted upon by the donee, the title legally passes to the donee and cannot be defeated by any intention of the donor to the contrary. Thus, in a case where the gift deed was deposited with the Registrar, it was held that the gift was completed and could not be superseded by a subsequently registered deed.
If there is an acceptance of the gift after execution of the deed, even though the registration was postponed to a later date, the gift would remain irrevocable, but if there is no acceptance at all, registration does not make the gift irrevocable.
MODE OF TRANSFERS- MOVABLES
With regard to movables, this section provides two alternative modes of transfer-
Registered deed signed by or on behalf of the donor; or,
delivery of possession
delivery of possession is the usual mode of transfer in a gift of goods. As in English law, an oral gift without delivery of possession would be a promise without consideration. It would transfer no property to the donee and would in fact be no gif at all.
When the donee is already in possession, no further delivery is required according to the English cases. These would no doubt be followed in India, for the same rule obtains in regard to immovable property. In an Allahabad case, a husband made a fixed deposit of money in a bank repayable to himself or his wife or survivor, and it was held that this involved no delivery and was not therefore a gift to the wife.
Where the gift deed clearly showed that the possession of the property covered by the deed had been handed over to the donee, there was acceptance of the gift and the gift could not be revoked.
A valid gift must be ordinarily followed by possession, according to the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. Where the gifted property is capable of physical possession, non-delivery of the property makes a gift invalid.
In order that a gift of movable property is valid under the provisions of section 123. the donor should have done all that he can to put the subject matter of the gift within the power of the donee to obtain possession.
Where the donee is a minor and is living with the donor and under his care, the question of delivery of possession to complete the gift does not arise. The gift is valid.
Before the amendment of section 130 by the insertion of the words ‘whether with or without consideration’, it was held that actionable claims were not movable property under this section and a gift of an actionable claim must be in writing under section 130 and need not be registered. But delivery was held to be a sufficient transfer in the case of a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque payable to bearer. Government promissory notes were transferable by endorsement and unless so endorsed, the gift was not complete.
GIFT OF EXISTING AND FUTURE PROPERTY
There cannot be a gift of future property, for such a gift can only be a promise, and a promise not supported by consideration is invalid as a contract. Accordingly, the definition in section 122 is limited to existing property. In a sale or mortgage, there is consideration, and so an assignment of future property by way of sale or mortgage operates as a contract.
But a deed of gift of existing property is not invalid as to that property; because it also professes to include future property. Similarly, an unregistered deed of gift of actionable claims and of immovable property was held to be valid as to the former, but void as to the latter.
There cannot be a gift of future property under Hindu or Mohammedan law.
GIFT TO SEVERAL ONE OF WHOM DOES NOT ACCEPT
The refusal of one will not prevent the gift taking effect as regards the share of the others. It is submitted that the terms of the section indicate a severance and assume that the donee take as tenants in common, for when the donees take as joint tenants, there is only one donee.
SUSPENSION OR REVOCATION OF GIFTS
A gift is a transfer of property and is therefore subject to the rules enacted in chapter two of the Act. Thus, if an absolute gift is made, subject to a condition restricting alienation, the condition would be void. Section 126 is controlled by section 10. a clause in a gift deed totally prohibiting alienation is void in view of section 10.
A condition reserving the profits to the donor for life is not repugnant. A gift may be subject to a condition precedent under section 21, and there is no transfer and no gift unless and until the condition is fulfilled.
If the condition precedent is impossible or illegal or immoral, the gift fails under section 25. this is exemplified under by the illustrations to that section and also by the illustrations to section 126 and 127 of the succession Act 1925. a gift to a husband and wife on condition of the donor having physical possession of the wife is invalid.
The section has, of course, no application where there is no condition as such, but a mere pious wish that the donee should maintain the donor.
Service tenures are closely analogous to gifts with an implied condition of revocation. All service tenures are resumable on a refusal to render the services. But there is a distinction between the grant of a land burdened with a condition of service and the grant of land as remuneration for an office.
There is again a further distinction as to the services to be rendered, which may be either personal or public.
The classification therefore is as follows:-
Grants of class A(1) are resumable not only if the performance of service is refused but also if the services are no longer required.
Grants of class A(2) are resumable if the performance of service is refused, but they are not resumable if the services are no longer required.
Grants of class B are really grants of an office of which the remuneration is the land when the office is terminated, the lands can be resumed.
REVOCABLE AT PLEASURE-NO GIFT
A gift may be revocable by being subject to a condition subsequent; or it may be contingent so that there is no gift at all, unless a condition precedent is fulfilled. But the condition cannot depend upon the will of the donor, for a gift revocable at pleasure is no gift at all.
Where no specific condition for revocation has been made in the deed itself, in the event of the failure of the donee to render services to the donor or maintain the donor, the gift cannot be revoked.
REVOCATION BY RECISSION
As the donee may not profit by his wrong, a gift may be revoked for coercion, fraud, misrepresentation or undue influence in the same way as a contract may be rescinded. But if the donor does not revoke, he cannot transfer his right to sue for revocation. But in case of the donor’s death, the cause of action survives to his legal representatives.
Coercion as defined in section 15 of the Indian Contract Act is wider than in English Law and need not proceed from the donee. It includes the committing or threatening to commit any act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code.
Fraud of the donor or his agent makes a gift voidable. But where the donor by reason of such fraud signs a deed of gift believing it to be an instrument of a different kind, the deed is a nullity and is void ab initio by the rule of non est factum. Such a gift is void and need not be revoked.
Not only fraud but even innocent misrepresentation under section 18(3) of the Indian Contract Act is a ground for revoking a gift.
The most usual ground for revocation is undue influence, as defined in section 18 of the Contract Act. The court cannot prevent a man from making an improvident gift or disposing off his property in a way that no right-minded man would be disposed to do; and if he does so deliberately, the court cannot help him, for it is not the province of the court to decide upon what terms a man may dispose off his property. But the improvidence of the deed may afford an argument that the donor did not intend it.
If a gift is not a spontaneous and an independent act of the donor, there may be a question of undue influence, but the presumption of undue influence will appear only when the gift is unconscionable particularly keeping in view the relationship of the parties.
A contract is not voidable because of the mistake of one party, and if both parties are under a mistake as to an essential matter, the contract is void and does not require rescission.
It is clear that a gift cannot be revoked on account of the mistake of the donor alone. So in a Madras case, the Collector was not allowed to revoke a grant made under a mistake as to the effect of certain departmental orders. But a mutual mistake will justify cancellation, as when a husband made and the wife accepted a gift in ignorance of the fact that it would be subject to a covenant in the marriage settlement. A mere mistake of law would not be sufficient for the revocation of a deed of a gift.
NO REVOCATION ALIUNDE
A gift may be revocable on a condition subsequent not depending upon the will of the donor; or it may be revocable on grounds which would justify rescission in the case of a contract. But it cannot be revoked for any other reason, for as already explained, a gift revocable at the pleasure of the donor is no gift at all.
The rule that a gift cannot be revoked except on the grounds mentioned in section 126 does not apply to an incomplete gift. An incomplete gift can be revoked at any time.
A donee not competent to contract and accepting property burdened to any obligation is not bound by his acceptance. But, if after becoming competent to contract and being aware of the obligation, he retains the property given, he becomes so bound.
A minor though not competent to contract, may be a donee, but on attaining majority, he has the right to repudiate the gift. If he retains the property after attaining majority, he is estopped from repudiating. The principle is the same as that applied in the case of minor partners by section 30 of the Indian Partnership Act 1932. In the case of a partnership, the estoppel arises from the retention of the property, and no doubt a reasonable time would be allowed for repudiation.
A universal donee is unknown to English law, according to which there is no universal succession except in the case of death or bankruptcy. But in Hindu law, this would occur when a man retires from the world and becomes an ascetic.
A gift of the whole estate of the donor would in most cases be impeachable as to land as a fraudulent transfer under section 53.
But this section is exclusive of section 53 and rests on the same principle as the first paragraph of section 127- Qui sensit commodum debet et sentire onus. The donee accepting the whole property becomes liable for the debts and other liabilities of the donor. Similarly when a Hindu widow transfers the whole of her estate in favour of the next reversioner, the donee is liable for her maintenance.
Section 128 of the Act does not provide anywhere that the donee is liable for all the debts due by the donor at the time of the gift. On a plain reading of the section, it is clear that the liability of the donee is to the extent of the property acquired by him by virtue of a gift deed from the donor, and cannot travel beyond the same.
If the universal donee were a minor, he would be under no liability unless he retained the property after attaining majority.
If any portion of the donor’s property, whether movable or immovable, is excluded from the gift, the donee is not a universal donee and the creditor is not entitled to the benefit of this section.
To conclude with we can say that a gift is the transfer of certain movable or immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration, by one person called the door, to another, called the donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee.
The acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the donor and while he is still capable of giving such acceptance. If the donee dies before giving acceptance, the gift is void.
For the purpose of making a gift of immovable property, the transfer must be effected by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor, and attested by at least two witnesses. For the purposes of making a gift of movable property, the transfer may be effected by a registered instrument signed as aforesaid or by delivery. Such delivery must be made in the same way as old goods may be delivered.
A gift comprising of both existing and future property is void as to the latter.
A gift of a thing to two or more donees, of whom one does not accept it, is void as to the interest which he would have taken had he accepted.
The donor and donee may agree that on the happening of any specified event which does not depend on the will of the donor a gift shall be suspended or revoked; but a gift which the parties agree shall be revocable wholly or in part, at the mere will of the donor is void wholly or in part, as the case may be.
A gift may also be revoked in any of the cases (save want or failure of consideration) in which, if it were a contract, it may be rescinded.
Save as aforesaid, a gift cannot be revoked.
Where a gift is in the form of a single transfer to the same person of several things of which one is, and others are not, burdened by an obligation, the donee can take nothing by the gift unless he accepts it fully.
Where a gift is in the form of two or more separate and independent transfers to the same person of several things, the donee is at liberty to accept one of them and refuse the others although the former may be beneficial and the latter onerous.
Where a gift consists of the donor’s whole property, the donee is personally liable for all the debts due by and liabilities of the donor at the time of the gift to the extent of the property comprised therein.
 Deo Saran v. Deokhi Bharti AIR 1924 Pat 657
 Tulsichand Kilachand v. CIT AIR 1961 SC 1023
 Mohori Bibbee v. Dhurmodas Ghose (1903) 30 Cal 539
 section 7
 supra note 1 at 126
 section 124
 Deo Narain v. Board of Revenue (1964) 1 All 375
 Amtul Nissa v. Mir Nuruddin (1898) 22 Bom 489
 Kanai Lal v. Kumar purnendu Nath (1946) 51 Cal WN 227
 Standing v. Bowring (1885) 31 Ch D 282
 Sarba Mohan Bannerjee v. Manmohan Banerjee (1933) 37 Cal WN 149
 Gangadhar Iyer v. KB Iyer AIR 1952 Tr & Coch 47
 Shakuntla Devi v. Amar Devi AIR 1985 HP 109. 111.
 Balmakund v. Bhagwan Das (1894) 16 All 185
 Mukhtiar Kaur v. Gulab Kaur AIR 1977 Punj 257
 Kolandiyli Ammal v. Changaram AIR 1962 Ker 344
 Tara Sahuani v. Ragunath Sahu (1962) Cut 575
 Amrithammal v. Ponnusani (1907) 17 Mad LJ 368
 Vannathi Valappil Janaki v. Puthiya Purayil Paru AIR 1986 Ker 110
 Ganeshdas Bhiwraj v. Suryabhan (1917) 13 Nag LR 18
 Ashkar Singh & anor v. Rawal Singh & anor AIR 1992 P & H 148, 150
 Suleman Isubji Dadabhai v. NaranbhaiDayabhai Patel (1980) 12 Guj LR 232
 R N Dawar v. Ganga Saran Dhama AIR 1993 Del 19, 22
 Venkatarayudu v. Subbamma (1903) 13 Mad LJ 302
 Girjaprasad v. Purshottam (1926) 28 Bom LR 421
 Deo Narain v. Kukar Bind (1902) 24 All 319 (FB)
 Sasi Bhusan v. Chandra Peshkar (1906) 33 Cal 861.
 Samrathi Devi v. Parasuram Pandey AIR 1975 Pat 140.
 Mallo v. Baktawari & ors. AIR 1985 All 160, 162
 Marci Celine DG Sets’souza v. Renie Fernandez AIR 1998 Ker 280
 Kalyanasndram v. Karuppa (1927) 50 Mad 193
 A. Kraishnan Iyer v. Lakshmi Amma AIR 1950 Tr & Coch 73
 R N Dawar v. Ganga Saran Dhama DRJ 1992 (24) 532
 Atmaram Sakharam v. Vaman Janardhan (1925) 49 Bom 388
 Kalyanasundram Pillai v. Karuppa Mooppanar 1928 52 Bom 313
 Bhagatrai v. Ghanshyamdas AIR 1948 Nag 326
 Dikshit v. Radha Krishna AIR 1948 Oudh 226
 Chennupati Venkatasubbamma v. Nelluri Narayanaswami AIR 1954 Mad 215
 Rameshwar Narain Singh v. Bikanath Koeri (1923) 67 IC 451
 Cochrane v. Moore (1890) 25 QBD 57
 Kilpin v. Ratley (1892) 1 QB 582
 Mt Nazi v. Mohanlal (1957) 7 Raj 487
 Paul v. Nathaniel (1931) 29 All LJ 417
 Kasi Ammal v. Vellat Gounder (1980) 2 Mad LJ 232
 Mukhtiar Kaur v. Gulab Kaur AIR 1977 Punj 257
 Gara Surppadu & ors. V. Pandranki Rami Naidu & ors. AIR 1984 AP 386, 390
 Sunder Bai v. Anandi Lal AIR 1983 All 23
 Perumal Ammal v. Perumal Naicker (1921) 44 Mad 196, 202
 Khursedji v. Personji (1888) 12 Bom 573
 Brindabini Behari v. Oudh Behari AIR 1947 All 179
 Rajah Sahib Perhlad v. Budhoo (1869) 12 Mad IA 275, 307
 Perumal v. Perumal (1921) 44 Mad 196
 Re Dugdale (1888) 38 Ch D 176
 Jagdeo Sharma v. Nandan Mahto AIR 1982 Pat 32
 Gangadhar Iyer v. KB Iyer AIR 1952 Tr & Coch 47
 Ghumna v. Ramchandra (1925) 47 All 619
 Tila Bewa v. Mana Bewa AIR 1962 Ori 130.
 Ansar Ali v. Grey (1905) 2 Cal LJ 403
 Raja of Vizianagram v. Appalaswami (1930) 59 Mad LJ 183
 Sri Raja Vencata Narasimha v. Sri Raja Sobhanadri (1906) 29 Mad 52
 Mool Raj v. Jamna Devi AIR 1995 HP 117
 Baijnath Singh v. Mussammat Biraj (1923) 2 Pat 52
 Aziz-un-nissa v. Suraj Husain (1934) All LJ 814
 supra note 63
 Cf Re Glubb, Bamfield v. Rogers (1900) 1 Ch 354
 Philips v. Mullings (1871) 7 Ch App 244
 James v. Couchman (1885) 29 Ch D 212
 Hall v. Hall (1873) 8 Ch App 430
 Collector of Salem v. Rangappa (1889) 12 Mad 404
 Ellis v. Ellis (1909) 26 TLR 166
 Standing v. Bowring (1885) 31 Ch D 282
 Narbadabai v. Mahadeo (1880) 5 Bom 99
 Shyam Behari Mal v. Maha Prasad (1930) 28 All LJ 99
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